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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. ISSUE

This research memorandum seeks to examine the following issue:
Does a Defendant have an Unlimited Entitlement to be Represented
by the Attorney of his/her Choice When the Attorney will be
Appointed by the Trial Chamber and Paid by the Tribunal?1

B. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
An indigent defendant does not have an unlimited entitlement to be represented
by the attorney of his or her choice. The ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence clearly
state in Rules 44 and 45 that assignment of counsel is administered by the Registrar of the
Tribunal. The Registrar provides a list to the defendants of counsel that are authorized to
appear before the tribunal. The defendant then requests certain counsel members and the
Registrar takes the preferences of the defendant into consideration when it issues its
decision on the assignment.
This memorandum is organized as follows. Part II briefly describes the factual
background of the issue of the appointment of counsel. Part III assesses the international
precedent relevant to the assignment of counsel up through and including the practice of

1

See United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [hereinafter ICTR], Office of the
Prosecutor, Legal Research Topics No. Nine, Facsimile dated 27 August 2000. The focus of this paper is
derived from the facsimile that stated and asked the following. “The Registry generally provides a
defendant with a list of approved attorneys from which one may be selected. Some defendants have
requested specific attorneys who are not on the list. If the attorney agrees to accept the case and is
otherwise qualified, the Registry will usually accommodate the defendant by placing the attorney on the list
and appointing him/her to represent the defendant. However, in some circumstances this might not be
possible. For instance, the attorney might not meet the Tribunal’s requirement of experience. Or, the
attorney might have a perceived conflict of interest that the defendant and the attorney would be willing to
ignore, but the Tribunal would not.”

1

the ICTR and the ICTY. Finally, Part III discusses national laws and precedent
governing how various countries treat the issue.
Part II explains that under the law of the ICTR Statute and the Directive on the
Assignment of Defense Counsel, accused defendants have the right to be assisted by
counsel. This right to counsel, as argued by ICTR indigent defendants, encompasses the
“right” to choose their counsel from the list of qualified attorneys. The practice of the
ICTR Registrar has enabled indigent defendants to submit requests for appointment of
counsel. However, this practice of choosing appointed counsel remains subject to the
final approval of the Registrar.
Part III establishes the procedural basis of the assignment of defense counsel for
the ICTR. Rules 44 and 45 of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTR are similar to the
ICTY but the Rules have expanded to include extra requirements such as the defense
counsel for the ICTR must have at least ten years relevant experience. The ICTR
decisions from both the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber have affirmed that an
indigent defendant does not have the “right” to choose their own counsel. The precedent
established by past war crimes tribunals have been in practice to appoint counsel that the
defendant requests. However the decision on the appointment has always been subject to
the Registrar’s final acceptance. The ICTR is the first time in which an indigent
defendant has argued that he has a “right” to choose his own counsel. International
standards and guidelines originating from the European Court of Human Rights and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee have affirmed that legal counsel should be
appointed for the defendant, with a caveat that the Court has the final decision of who is
appointed to represent indigent defendants.

2

The second section of Part III, discusses national precedents and practices in the
appointment of counsel. The United States unequivocally appoints all indigent
defendants counsel and maintains public defender programs where attorneys are selected
by the courts specifically to represent indigent defendants. In Canada, the administration
of justice is under the jurisdiction of each province. However, even the Supreme Court
of Canada has held that there is no constitutional right to be assigned counsel of a
defendant’s own choosing if the accused is indigent and subject to a provincial legal aid
program. England is the opposite of the United States in terms of appointing counsel.
Pursuant to their Legal Aid Act, an indigent defendant in a criminal case has a choice as
to which solicitor and counsel he employs. Lastly, South Africa before their new
Constitution in 1994 allowed indigent defendants to choose their own counsel. Yet, since
the new Constitution was adopted, there exists no right to choose appointed defense
counsel in South Africa.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
There is no question that each accused defendant has the right to be assisted by
defense counsel. This is the law as it appears under Article 20 of the ICTR Statute and
Article 2 of the Directive on the Assignment of Defense Counsel. However, in the case
of the ICTR defendants, all of whom have satisfied the requirement of indigency, the
issue that arose is whether they have a “right” to choose their counsel from the ICTR’s
Registrar’s list or whether they must accept counsel selected by the Registrar.
In practice, the ICTR Registrar has provided indigent defendants with a list of the
qualified defense counsel and curricula vitae and enabled them to choose.2 However, two

2

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Press Releases, ICTR Updates and Bulletins: Note on
Assignment of Defence Counsel, (Arusha, 22 Feb. 1999)

3

or three detainees have insisted on requesting defense counsel who are not on the
Registrar’s list. In doing this, the defendants have sought to turn the privilege afforded to
them by the Registrar, into a “right,” which historically, does not exist in any of the
international tribunals and most national laws. The practice of choosing appointed
counsel has always remained subject to the stated rules and procedures of the tribunal,
allowing the Registrar the final choice.
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. THE ICTR STATUTE AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established in 1994 when the
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 955.3 In Article 14 of the Statute
annexed to that resolution, the Council provided that the judges should adopt the rules of
procedure and evidence “for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials
and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other
appropriate matters of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with such
changes as they deem necessary.”4 Article 17 of the Statute, Investigation and
preparation of indictment, provided that “If questioned, the suspect shall be entitled to be
assisted by counsel of his or her own choice, including the right to have legal assistance
assigned to the suspect without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/defence.html>. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at TAB #5]
3

3 J. Oppenheim & W. van der Wolf, Global War Crimes Tribunal Collection, 247, 247 (J. Oppenheim &
W. van der Wolf eds, 2000). [Reprinting of U.N. Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/REV.1 (1995), entered into force 29 June 1995.] [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
TAB #25]
4

Id. at 253. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB #25]

4

not have sufficient means to pay for it….”5 These two articles, when read together, form
the basis for the present day rules of procedure and evidence which has since been
amended to include some additional requirements for the attorney’s counsel to meet in
order to represent the indigent defendant or the accused.
The ICTR Statute, in Article 20(4)(d), Rights of the accused, guarantees the
defendant’s right to legal assistance, in the following terms:
the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees…to
be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to
him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means
to pay for it;6

The question of the right to appointment of counsel and ultimately who makes the choice
of an indigent defendants’ counsel emerge within several of the tribunal’s rules of
procedure.
Rule 42, Rights of Suspects during Investigation, outlines a suspects rights when
questioned by the Prosecutor. It provides:

A) A suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor shall have the
following rights of which he shall be informed by the Prosecutor
prior to questioning, in a language he speaks and understands:
(i) the right to be assisted by counsel of his choice or to have legal
assistance assigned to him without payment if he does not have
sufficient means to pay for it;7

5

Id. at 254. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB #25]

6

International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, ICDAA Reports, Publications and Resolutions
Online, at 1 (visited Nov. 24, 2000) <http://www.hri.ca/partners/aiad-icdaa/icc/counsel.html>.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB #2]

7

3 J. Oppenheim & W. van der Wolf, Global War Crimes Tribunal Collection, 247, 269 (J. Oppenheim &
W. van der Wolf eds., 2000). (Reprinting of U.N. Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) establishing the

5

The right to be assisted by counsel is an unfettered guarantee in this rule; however the
choice of counsel is limited if the defendant is indigent. The language and phasing of the
rule clearly indicates that if the defendant is able to pay for legal counsel, there is a right
to be assisted by counsel of the defendant’s own choosing provided counsel meets the
Tribunal’s qualifications. However, if the defendant is indigent, then the later part of the
sentence applies, namely that legal assistance will be “assigned to him.” This language
suggests no choice on the part of the defendant.
Rule 44 of the rules of procedure and evidence as amended on June 26, 2000, sets
out the following requirements for the appointment and qualifications of counsel:
A) Counsel engaged by a suspect or an accused shall file his power of
attorney with the Registrar at the earliest opportunity. Subject to
verification by the Registrar, a counsel shall be considered
qualified to represent a suspect or accused, provided that he is
admitted to the practice of law in a State, or is a University
professor of law.
B) In the performance of their duties counsel shall be subject to the
relevant provisions of the Statute, the Rules, the Rules of Detention
and any other rules or regulations adopted by the Tribunal, the
Host Country Agreement, the Code of Conduct and the codes of
practice and ethics governing their profession and, if applicable,
the Directive on the Assignment of Defense Counsel.8

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/REV.1 (1995), entered into force 29 June 1995.) (Emphasis added.) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at TAB #25]
8

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ICTR/3.Rev. 8
(1996), adopted by the Tribunal on July 5, 1995,
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/260600/index.html>. In this latest version, there is a new section as
part of Rule 44 that deals with Duty Counsel. Duty counsel, as stated in this rule, is subject to the same
requirements as assigned counsel under Rule 45. Their purpose is to provide an accused defendant with
counsel at the detention facility or if a suspect is transferred under Rule 40 and is unrepresented at any time
after being transferred to the Tribunal. The Registrar will appoint duty counsel from a list maintained by
the Registry. Duty counsel will represent the accused or suspect and provide initial legal advice and
assistance until such time when counsel is engaged by the suspect, or assigned under Rule 45. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at TAB #4]

6

Rule 45, Assignment of Counsel, describes the list of counsel, how the attorneys
apply to have their names added to the Registrar’s list, the procedure for assigning
counsel to indigent defendants and the mention of circumstances in which the Registrar
would replace counsel. Pursuant to this Rule, the Registrar maintains a list of counsel
who “speak one or both of the working languages of the tribunal [French or English],
meet the requirements of Rule 44, have at least 10 years’ relevant experience, and have
indicated their willingness to be assigned by the Tribunal to indigent suspects or
accused….”9 It is worth noting that although the ICTR Rules of Procedure were modeled
after those adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,10
the requirement of ten years of relevant experience is unique to the ICTR. The ICTR has
greatly expanded the initial version of the rules to give greater meaning to ambiguous
phrases.
The procedure for assigning counsel to an indigent defendant in Rule 45 has three
parts. The first part provides that a request for assignment of counsel is to be made to the
Registrar. Pursuant to the second part, the Registrar inquires into the financial means of
the suspect or accused and makes a determination of indigence. “To date, all of the
accused persons in the custody of the ICTR have claimed to be indigent, requiring
appointed defense counsel.”11 The third part states that “If he [Registrar] decides that the

9

Id. at 5. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB #4]

10

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia hereinafter will be referred to as the
ICTY.

11

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Press Releases, ICTR Updates and Bulletins: Note on
Assignment of Defence Counsel, (Arusha, 22 Feb. 1999)
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/defence.html>. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
TAB #5]

7

criteria are met, he shall assign counsel from the list; if he decides to the contrary, he
shall inform the suspect or accused that the request is refused.”12 This rule clearly
establishes the fact that the Registrar is the person who assigns counsel for indigent
defendants, not the converse that defendants themselves have a right to choose counsel
from the Registrars’ list.
Rule 45, sections (D), (H) and (I) delve deeper into the procedural problems if a
request is refused, when and who replaces an assigned counsel and lastly, when counsel
would be permitted to withdraw. Rule 45(d) states that “If a request is refused, a further
reasoned request may be made by the suspect or the accused to the Registrar upon
showing a change in circumstances.”13 Section (H) of the same rule addresses the
situation where “Under exceptional circumstances, at the request of the suspect or
accused or his counsel, the Chamber may instruct the Registrar to replace an assigned
counsel, upon good cause being shown and after having been satisfied that the request is
not designed to delay the proceedings.”14 Lastly in section (I), the rule speaks about the
duty of assigned counsel and contemplates the situations where counsel is permitted to
withdraw from a case. It states:
It is understood that Counsel will represent the accused and
conduct the case to finality. Failure to do so, absent just cause
approved by the Chamber, may result in forfeiture of fees in
whole or in part. In such circumstances the Chamber may
make an order accordingly. Counsel shall only be permitted to

12
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withdraw from the case to which he has been assigned in the
most exceptional circumstances.15
These sections when combined as a whole relate to the situations wherein the Registrar
has already appointed counsel. Yet, the ICTR Statute is silent with respect to the issue of
an indigent defendant’s choice of his own counsel if that counsel is not on the list
maintained by the Registrar. This silence suggests that the drafters of the Rules did not
envision that indigent defendants would be given a choice, because the decision was left
to the discretion of the Registrar who assigns counsel if a defendant is indigent.
However, the question arose in a case before the ICTR as to whether an indigent
defendant could be represented by a Canadian lawyer not presently available on the
Registrar’s list.
B. THE ICTR’s CASE LAW
Both the ICTR Trial Chamber and ICTR Appeal Chamber decisions affirm Rules
44 and 45 of Procedure and Evidence for the Tribunal. The cases uphold an indigent
defendant’s right to counsel but not of their own choosing. The Registrar maintains the
right to appoint counsel for indigent defendants from its list of qualified counsel. The
standards for appointing counsel are found in the Directive on the Assignment of Defense
Counsel.
The ICTR in amendments adopted on June 6, 1997 to the Directive on the
Assignment of Defense Counsel reference the scope of the assignment of counsel when
appointed by the Registrar. Article 3 of the Directive states clearly that a person who has
insufficient means and is being prosecuted before the Tribunal may be assigned counsel
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free of charge.16 Article 10(A)(I) of the same directive states that after the suspect has
been deemed indigent, the Registrar shall decide “to assign Counsel and choose for this
purpose a name from the list drawn up in accordance with Article 13.” Article 15(A)(ii),
states that “no counsel shall be assigned to more than one suspect or accused unless the
case involve the same suspect or accused.”17

1. ICTR TRIAL CHAMBER DECISIONS
The ICTR, in a decision rendered by Trial Chamber I on June 11, 1997, In the
Matter of Ntakirutimana affirmed the Registrar’s power as the final decision-maker for
assignments of defense counsel. The decision offered some suggestions on how to
balance an indigent suspects’ right to a fair trial and the rules established by Tribunal.
The Chamber stated:
Whereas, the principle having thus been set out that the final decision for
the assignment of counsel and of the choice of such counsel rests with the
Registrar, the Tribunal submits nonetheless that, mindful to ensure that the
indigent accused receives the most efficient defense possible in the context
of a fair trial, an indigent accused should be offered the possibility of
designating the counsel of his or her own choice from the list drawn up by
the Registrar for this purpose, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules and Article
13 of the Directive, the Registrar having to take into consideration the
wishes of the accused, unless the Registrar has reasonable and valid
grounds not to grant the request of the accused.18
16

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel, U.N.
ICTR/2/L.2, January 9, 1996, amended on July 1, 1999.
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In the case of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the accused raised the issue regarding the assignment of co-counsel.
The ICTR decided using similar language as above, that the Registrar must also take into account, among
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The principle of a fair trial through the assignment of counsel is restated in the
aforementioned decision by the ICTR Trial Chamber with an added caveat that an
indigent accused “should be offered the possibility” of designating the counsel of his own
choice from the Registrar’s list.19 The language of the decision continues in the same
tone, when the Court stated the Registrar should “take into consideration the wishes” of
the accused as if to say the Registrar may tolerate the practice of choosing counsel. But
the Court does not use words like “shall,” “must,” “command,” or “order” to describe
how the accused’s choice should be factored into the Registrar’s decision. It is simply a
request made by the accused, in the hope of retaining the counsel he has chosen.
The ICTR Registrar issued a moratorium on the assignment of French and
Canadian lawyers to indigent suspects on November 18, 1998. The Registrar stated that
the ban on these lawyers was a temporary measure to combat the “over-representation” of
lawyers from these two countries. Furthermore, the Registrar said it was imposed not
only to obtain a “better distribution in the representation of different legal systems” but
also because “a certain group of lawyers was trying to take over all the legal
representation” of ICTR detainees.20 To date, the ICTR had appointed defense counsel

other things, “the resources of the Tribunal, the proven skill and experience of the legal systems, without
distinction, and consider the age, gender, race or nationality of candidates.”
See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, ICTR-9721-T, Decision on Nyiramasuhuko’s Preliminary Motion Based on the Defects in the Form and the
Substance of the Indictment (Nov. 1, 2000)
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Nyiramasuhuko/decisions/011100.html>. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB #17]
19
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from these two countries in disproportionate numbers- -nearly one-half of all
appointments.”21 The ban that lasted until October 27, 1999 meant that these French and
Canadian lawyers, though on the Registrar’s list, could not be assigned.

2. ICTR APPEALS CHAMBER DECISIONS
An Appeals Chamber decision on October 27, 1999 ended the moratorium on
French and Canadian lawyers’ assignment to indigent defendants. The first indigent
defendant to receive counsel after the ban was former Rwandan Mayor, Jean-Paul
Akayesu. The Registrar was ordered by the Appeals Chamber to assign Canadian
lawyer, John Philpot to Akayesu’s defense. When asked about the practice of assigning
counsel, the Registrar, Dr. Agwu Okali, said that “an indigent accused would be asked to
choose three or four lawyers as alternative choices from the overall list of approved
counsel.” But, he added “we will assign, and we may or may not choose a Canadian
lawyer.”22 The Registrar justified this by stating, “ICTR judges had made it clear that the
assignment of defense counsel remained the domain of the Registrar.”23
In the Trial Chamber’s Judgement ruling issued on September 2, 1998, in the case
of Jean-Paul Akayesu, paragraph 13 outlines the many assignments of counsel the
Registrar made during the course of the defendant’s trial. The Registrar assigned first
21

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Press Releases, ICTR Updates and Bulletins: Note on
Assignment of Defence Counsel, (Arusha, 22 Feb. 1999)
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/defence.html>. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
TAB #5]
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John Sheers, then Michael Karnavas, John Philpot, Nicolas Tiangaye and Patrice
Monthé.24 Each time an attorney withdrew from representation, the Registrar assigned
new counsel to represent Akayesu pursuant to the Trial Chamber’s orders. The Trial
Chamber wanted to ensure that Akayesu was represented by counsel throughout his trial.
Another case before the Appeals Chamber involved, the ex-Rwandan Prime
Minister, Jean Kambanda, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment on September 4,
1998, after pleading guilty to genocide and crimes against humanity, asserted a claim that
he had been denied the right to a lawyer of his choice. On October 19, 2000, the Appeals
Chamber answered the claim by stating that there was no automatic right for receiving
legal assistance to have a lawyer of their own choosing and “If Kambanda was unhappy
with his lawyer, he had ample time to complain but did not do so.”25 The Appeals
Chamber refers on this point “to the reasoning of Trial Chamber I in the Ntakirutimana
case and concludes, in the light of a textual and systematic interpretation of the
provisions of the Statute and the Rules, read in conjunction with relevant decisions from
the Human Rights Committee and the organs of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, that the right to free legal
assistance by counsel does not confer the right to choose one’s counsel.”26

24
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In February of 1999, the ICTR Registrar issued a Position Paper explaining its
position on the assignment of defense counsel. The Paper states:

under law, there exists a right to have defense counsel; secondly, that
this right is universally understood as a right to have defense counsel
assigned to one if one is unable to retain a lawyer for himself or
herself; and thirdly, that in the case where defense counsel is being
appointed free of charge, there does not exist any right to choose a
particular individual to serve as appointed defense counsel.27

The ICTR has provided the indigent suspects with a list of qualified defense counsel and
curricula vitae and “enabled them to choose. This was first done by providing successive
short lists to the detainees, and later modified by presenting the full list of lawyers at
once.”28 In practice, at the request of some detainees, the ICTR Registrar has added some
defense counsel not originally on the list in order to facilitate the detainees’ choice of
counsel.29 Moreover, two to three detainees have insisted on requesting defense counsel
outside the established guidelines.30 By asking the Registrar for these defense counsel,
the detainees are arguing that they have a right to choose their own counsel, but because
the suspects are indigent, the right that exists is actually only to be assigned counsel.

27
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Assignment of Defence Counsel, (Arusha, 22 Feb. 1999)
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C. THE PRECENDENT OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
1. ICTY DECISIONS
The ICTY Trial Chamber I, interpreted the right of a defendant to the assignment
of counsel in its decision dated June 24, 1996 in the cases of Delalić, Mucić, Delić and
Landžo. The ICTY Trial Chamber stated:
The Statute does not specifically state that the right to assigned counsel is
also a right to assigned counsel of the accused’s own choosing. Indeed,
the right to assigned counsel under the Directive is not totally without
limit- -counsel may only be assigned if they are on a list maintained by the
Registrar of the International Tribunal…however, the practice of the
Registry of the International Tribunal has been to permit the accused to
select any available counsel from this list and to add counsel to the list if
selected by an accused, provided that such counsel meets the necessary
criteria. The Trial Chamber supports this practice, within practical
limits.31

The ICTY thus recognized that indigent defendants do not have a right to choose their
own counsel. The opinion suggests that the practice of the Registry permitting the
accused to select any available counsel from the list is not a right, but a privilege. The
language in the decision is carefully worded to allow the practice to continue if it is
“within practical limits.” This means that if the practice impedes the duties of the
Registrar in appointment of counsel, the practice should give way to the Rule. The Rules
of Procedure state that the Registrar appoints counsel and empower the Registrar to
overrule the practice of permitting indigent accused to select counsel.

31
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In Erdemović, a case before the ICTY, the Trial Chamber grappled with the issue
of the Registrar’s refusal to assign the counsel requested by the accused because counsel
did not meet the language requirement of Rule 45(A). The counsel requested by
Erdemović did not speak either French or English, which are the two working languages
of the tribunal. Following applications by the accused and the Prosecutor, Judge Jorda
issued an order on May 28, 1996 stating that an exceptional situation existed and that the
requested counsel should be assigned to the accused. “The assignment of Mr. Babić to
the accused, Dražen Erdemović did, however, lead to problems of communication and
misunderstandings (for example, concerning the effect of a guilty plea and concerning the
difference between crimes against humanity and war crimes), which the Appeals
Chamber raised proprio motu and which let it to remit the case to a new Trial Chamber
for a re-plea.”32
The UN Secretary-General when promulgating the Statute for the ICTY, said the
ICTY had to comply with Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Embodied in this text are internationally recognized standards regarding
the rights of the suspect or accused at all stages of trial proceedings.33 The SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations noted in his report contained in the Statute of the ICTY
(S/25704) that “it was axiomatic that the Tribunal must fully respect internationally
recognized standards”34 as set forth in this instrument.
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The Secretary-General was referring to the ICTY when he addressed his
comments but the same is true for the ICTR. He further says that:
Articles 18 and 21 of the Statute [ICCPR] provide, inter alia, for the
suspect during the investigation, and the accused, from the time of his
indictment, to have the right to legal assistance from a counsel of his
own choice or, if indigent, to free legal assistance.”35
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights36 does not grant the accused
choice of counsel if he is found to be indigent. The only entitlement that is allowed to
indigent defendants is the right to free legal assistance. This is similar to Rules 44 and 45
of the ICTR, which guarantee the right to counsel and confer on the Registrar the
responsibility for appointing said counsel to indigent defendants.

2. NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL
The practice of issuing indigent defendants free choice in the selection of court
appointed defense counsel is not unique to the ICTR; however the issue has never been
argued to be a “right” until now. Dating back as far as the Nuremberg Tribunal, in a
1948 article by the Prosecutor of Nuremberg, Benjamin Ferencz, entitled, “Nurnberg
Trial Procedure and the Rights of the Accused”37 reports that each accused defendant had
the right to representation by an attorney of his choosing. Moreover, many of the
accused had assigned counsel who were former members of the Nazi Party or the SS:
Every defendant has had the right under the law to be represented by
counsel of his own selection providing such counsel was qualified to
conduct cases before the German courts or was specifically authorized
35
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by the Tribunal. In practice this has meant that no German lawyer has
ever been excluded if he was requested as counsel for a defendant. In
fact most of the German counsel chosen are themselves subject to
arrest or trial in German courts under German law for membership in
the Nazi Party or the criminal SS. If tried, many of them would be
barred from legal practice but they have, through the intervention of
the American authorities, even been given immunity from prosecution
in their own courts in order to ensure that accused war criminals will
have a free choice of counsel from those Germans whom they consider
best suited to defend them. Only three defendants requested American
counsel. Two of these requests were promptly approved. The other,
which was a request made late in the trial to have an American
substituted for one of the German counsel who had previously been
selected by the defendant himself, was disapproved. The Tribunal
expressed doubt of the sincerity of the application when pointing out
that the American was not, in fact, available. It was the opinion of the
Judges before whom he was to appear that the attorney had by his
previous conduct defying orders of the Military Governor and by his
violation of standing Military Government regulations disqualified
himself. The right of a Tribunal to protect itself from abuse by
unscrupulous practitioners is inherent in every court and, in exercising
that right in the one case, the Nurnberg judges made it clear that they
did not intend to bar the defendants from the ethical employment of
reputable American counsel. This same tribunal later approved
American counsel for another defendant.”38
The nationality of the defense counsel was not a factor in exclusion from representation
by the Tribunal. In fact, “the attorneys were paid by the Tribunal, since all of the bank
accounts had been seized.”39
The practice of permitting indigent defendants the choice of court appointed
counsel from the Registrar’s list may have originated due to the concern that the accused
would try to argue on appeal that they did not receive a fair trial. “The London Charter
stated unequivocally that defendants were to be allowed the counsel of their choice…the

38

Id. (Emphasis added.) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at TAB #27]

39

Ann Tusa and John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial 216 (New York, Anthenum) (1984). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB #28]

18

point…was that these men must not be given the slightest excuse to protest afterward that
they had been denied a fair trial.”40

3. TOKYO TRIBUNAL
In the Tokyo Tribunal, the procedure of the tribunal was similar to the ICTR
wherein “each of the accused had a Japanese chief counsel and at least one Japanese
associate counsel of his own choosing.”41 Similarly, the Tokyo Tribunal like the ICTR
Registrar can appoint a co-counsel to assist the assigned counsel, but only whenever
appropriate and at the request of the assigned counsel.42

4. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In the European Court of Human Rights, Article 91 of its Rules, dated on
November 4, 1998, allows for persons who are declared indigent to obtain legal
assistance. One judgment decided on August 28, 1992, Croissant v. Germany dealt with
the issue of court appointed counsel. The defendant, was appointed three court appointed
attorneys, the last was not his preferred choice. Mr. Croissant wanted the appointment of
an attorney who presented a probable conflict of interest situation. The European Court,
in paragraph 29 of its decision stated:

40
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It is true that Article 6 para. 3 (c) entitles everyone charged with a
criminal offense to be defended by counsel of his own choosing (see
the Pakelli v. Germany judgment of 25 April 1983, Series A no. 64, p.
15, para. 31). Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the importance of a
relationship of confidence between lawyer and client, this right cannot
be considered to be absolute. It is necessarily subject to certain
limitations where free legal aid is concerned and also where, as in the
present case, it is for the courts to decide whether the interests of
justice require that the accused be defended by counsel appointed by
them. When appointing defense counsel the national courts must
certainly have regard to the defendant’s wishes; indeed, German law
contemplates such a course (Article 142 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure; see paragraph 20 above). However, they can override
those wishes when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for
holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice.43

The European Court held that there are limitations on the right to counsel of a suspect’s
own choosing in a criminal case, where free legal aid is concerned and a defendant is
indigent. Even in situations where the Court deems that a defendant should be
represented because it is in the best “interests of judgment,” the Court appoints the
defense counsel. In this case, the Stuttgart Regional Court appointed a third defense
counsel to the defendant to ensure that he was adequately represented throughout the trial
due to the length, size, and complexity of the case. However, the defendant raised an
objection to the appointment of this defense counsel because the attorney was a member
of the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP), which the defendant opposed.
National courts when appointing defense counsel must have regard to the
defendant’s wishes as to who should represent the defendant, but an indigent defendant
still does not have an absolute right to the appointment of counsel of his own choosing.
In practice, this means that a national court can either find relevant and sufficient grounds
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for not appointing the indigent defendant’s particular counsel or a national court can find
it is in the interests of justice to appoint this counsel themselves without considering the
defendant’s wishes. The European Court found the later, and held that “the fact that Mr.
Hauser was a member of the SDP did not justify revoking his appointment” and “he [Mr.
Hauser] was in a position to appear for the defendant in spite of their political
differences.”44 The European Court ruled that the appointment of the third counsel to the
indigent defendant was proper.
5. INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES
In 1991, a task force of legal experts from numerous countries including the
United States of America, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom convened in
Syracuse, Italy. The group addressed human rights in criminal justice systems and set out
a general guideline 2.5 that addresses the appointment of defense counsel through legal
assistance. It states the following:
2.5 Legal assistance by qualified counsel shall be granted by the
competent authority at the request of the defendant or ex officio; as a
rule, the lawyer of the defendant's choice shall be appointed; if the
defendant wants to defend himself and appears fully capable of
carrying out his or her own defense, she or he is entitled to do so.45
The task force made clear that this guideline was only meant to be used in an advisory
nature and is not binding on any court. The guideline is similar to most procedural rules
governing assignment of defense counsel, with the exception of the phrase “as a rule, the
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lawyer of the defendant’s choice shall be appointed.” There are no such rules providing
that an indigent defendant has an absolute choice of counsel.
Whereas the guidelines of the Conference of Syracuse had no binding authority,
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has actual power. The Council
consists of the Heads of State of each member State and is required to meet two times a
year to issue general guidelines and objectives of the community. These members on the
Council have the capacity and authority to bind the community as acting representatives
for their States and can even negotiate treaties.46 In a resolution adopted on January 8,
1993, the Council set out a recommendation to governments of member States. In
paragraph 3, it states:
Recommend to governments of member States:
3. To facilitate effective access to justice for the very poor, especially
by the following:
a) offering legal aid or any other form of assistance in all jurisdictions
(civil, criminal, commercial, administrative, social, etc.) and for all
procedures, contentious or free, regardless of the capacity in which
these parties intervene;
(…)
c. recognizing the right to assistance of competent counsel, selected
freely, to the extent possible, to whom suitable payment shall be
granted;47
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addressing European Union law.

47

International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, ICDAA Petition and Appeal Brief, Jean-Paul
Akayesu v. Prosecutor, Case No.: ICTR-96-4-A, Brief of the International Criminal Defence Attorneys
Association (Article 74 Rules of Procedure and Evidence) at 17 (June, 1999)
<http://www.hri.ca/partners/aiad-icdaa/petition/ictrbrief.html>. (Emphasis added) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at TAB #14]

22

This resolution is a departure from the standard legal aid programs for indigent suspects
because counsel appointments are extended to reach proceedings that are not criminal in
nature in section a. However, in section c, the Council restates the same procedures now
used by the ICTR. When the Council of Europe recognized the right to assistance of
competent counsel, selected freely, they included a restrictive phrase “to the extent
possible.” This phrase directly follows the word freely, and indicates that the Council
does not recognize a right of an indigent defendant to select his own counsel. But,
instead, the language within the guideline stands for the proposition that certain
limitations apply to some situations, where it is not possible for a defendant to choose his
own counsel freely.
The interpretation of Article 14 of the ICCPR was scrutinized when the United
Nations Human Rights Committee decided a series of cases in the late 1980’s and early
1990’s. One such case was Wright v. Jamaica in 1995. “The United Nations Human
Rights Committee…held that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
does not entitle the accused to choose counsel provided to him free of charge.”48 The UN
Human Rights Committee has a different standard for appointed counsel.49 It gives more
responsibility to the State, to ensure effective representation. “In Kelly v. Jamaica, the
UN Human Rights Committee stated that while Article 14(3)(d) does not allow defendant
to choose his or her court-appointed counsel, the state must take steps to ensure that
counsel provides effective representation.” 50 In this case, the appointed counsel
48
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abandoned the appeal without consulting the defendant, which in turn, infringed on the
suspect’s right to counsel.
The other cases consistently found no violations of Article 14. In Berry v.
Jamaica (1994), the lawyer was privately retained51 by the defendant, hence the
defendant had the choice of his counsel. Accordingly, a violation of Article 14 only
arises when the counsel chosen for an indigent defendant violates the court rules or the
professional ethics code, similar to the facts in Collins v. Jamaica (1992). Although in
this case, the Committee held the violation did not rise to the level of professional
misconduct due to “the absence of clear evidence of professional negligence on the part
of counsel, it is not for the Committee to question the latter’s professional judgement.”52
The United Nations Human Rights Committee held in all of these cases that the ICCPR
does not entitle the accused to choose counsel free of charge. Many national jurisdictions
have similar procedures governing the appointment of defense counsel if a defendant is
found to be indigent through the determination of a legal aid office or a court.
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D. NATIONAL LAWS AND PRECEDENT REGARDING APPOINTMENT OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL

1. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In the United States, the courts do not recognize the right of an indigent accused
to select his own counsel.53 The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.”54 The Federal Statute discusses appointment of counsel in 18 U.S.C.S. §3006A
(2000), under adequate representation of defendants. It states “counsel furnishing
representation under the plan shall be selected form a panel of attorneys designated or
approved by the court, or from a bar association, legal aid agency, or defender
organization furnishing representation pursuant to the plan.”55 Unless an indigent
defendant waives his right to be represented by counsel, the United States magistrate
judge or the court “shall appoint counsel to represent him.”56
The reasoning behind the United States’ reluctance to allow an indigent accused
to select his own counsel have been speculated by authors LaFave and Israel. They state
three possible justifications:

53

International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association, ICDAA Petition and Appeal Brief, Jean-Paul
Akayesu v. Prosecutor, Case No.: ICTR-96-4-A, Brief of the International Criminal Defence Attorneys
Association (Article 74 Rules of Procedure and Evidence) at 21 (June, 1999)
<http://www.hri.ca/partners/aiad-icdaa/petition/ictrbrief.html>. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at TAB #14] See State v. Stenson (1997) and State v. Henry (1998), Gideon v. Wainwright
(1963).
54

Georgetown Law Journal, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: III. Trial [Right to
Counsel], 84 Geo. L.J. 1115, 1115 (1996). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB #36]

55

18 U.S.C.S. § 3006A(b) (Lexis, LEXSTAT 2000 ). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB
#34]

56

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at TAB #34]

25

First, judges assume that they can choose a more able attorney than the
indigent because they know the abilities of the available local counsel.
Second, there is concern that allowing defendant to choose his own
attorney will disrupt the ‘even handed distribution of assignments.’
Accepting defendant’s choice is likely to impose a substantial burden
on the more experienced attorneys, as well as give an advantage to
repeat offenders, who are most likely to know and select those
attorneys. Third, since the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant
a right only to representation that is competent, and not to that
representation that he believes (correctly or not) to be the best, the trial
court may value over the defendants’ choice the administrative
convenience of an appointment system that ignores defendant’s
preference.57

The first justification, wherein judges can choose a more able attorney for an indigent
defendant than if he choose for himself, could be used as an argument by the ICTR
Registrar for overruling the practice of a defendants’ choosing counsel. Several indigent
defendants have chosen counsel that are not on the list maintained by the Registrar of
qualified counsel to practice in front of the Tribunal. When counsel was appointed at the
request of the indigent defendants there were scheduling conflicts and language barriers
that impeded the Tribunal’s effectiveness. An appointment system saves time and effort
as the Tribunal need not spend time writing letters back and forth to determine an
indigent defendant’s request for a particular counsel member. Therefore if a conflict does
arise in the representation of an indigent defendant, he need only ask for a replacement of
appointed counsel.
Local Rule 48(d)(3) governs the appointment of counsel in “capital cases” heard
before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. It states that upon
application by the defense and a finding of indigency, “the Court shall…appoint a team
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of two or more attorneys to represent the defendant.”58 One of the differences between
United States laws and the ICTR is that when a criminal is found guilty of a capital
offense in the U.S., there is the possibility, varying by state, that an accused defendant
may receive a death penalty sentence. In contrast, the maximum sentence an accused can
receive in the ICTR is a life imprisonment.
The indigent defendants who are assigned counsel through the ICTR are Hutu
people who organized and carried out crimes not just against one individual but a whole
population of Tutsi people. They are accused of such crimes as genocide, crimes against
humanity, and incitement to these crimes. If a defendant in the United States is guilty of
a capital offense for the death of just one person, they may face the death penalty in some
states. The significance of these facts is that even in the case of an indigent defendant
before the ICTR, there is no danger of losing their life if the case is not won. However,
where an indigent defendant is not given the right to choice their own counsel, in the U.S.
their life is at risk, which is a far worse punishment than a sentence of life imprisonment.

2. CANADA
In Canada, the administration of justice is under the jurisdiction of each
province.59 In the case of Panacui v. Legal Aid Society of Alberta (1998), the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench held that there exists no “constitutional right of an accused
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person to be assigned counsel of his choice.”60 In Quebec, the issue of the right of a legal
aid recipient to choose his own lawyer has not been legally contested.61 In R. v. Therens
(1985), the question the court answered (from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal) was
the rights of a “detained” person within the meaning of Section 10(b) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms “to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be
informed of that right.”62 The Supreme Court of Canada held that the admission of
evidence must be excluded and a new trial ordered because neither of the two rights
under Section 10(b) were honored by the police. In an appeal from New Brunswick, the
Supreme Court of Canada dealt with voluntary waiver of the right to counsel and the test
for the state of mind of the defendant when waiving this right.63 The Court held that the
admissibility of a confession made while the accused is in an intoxicated state and
without the benefit of counsel was not a voluntary waiver of her Section 10(b) right to
counsel under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench decided a case in February of 2000 in
which an indigent defendant was convicted of sexual assault and causing bodily harm.
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The defendant, although indigent, did not qualify for legal aid but was appointed two
lawyers by the court in order that he be ensured a fair trial. The Court held:
While every indigent person who is charged with a criminal offense is
not automatically entitled to have counsel appointed by the court, s. 7
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms entitles a person to
have counsel appointed and funded by the state where the issues
involved in the case are complex and the consequences are serious.64

In a companion case, R. v. Schafer (1999), the judge noted that applications for the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants not falling within provincial legal aid
plans have increasingly been considered by courts across Canada. “It is now well
established that an accused person charged with serious criminal offenses for which (if
convicted) a lengthy period of incarceration is likely is entitled to court authorized
appointment of legal counsel if the applicant is indigent and counsel found to be
necessary for the accused to obtain a fair trial.”65
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, in R. v. Rockwood (1989) considered the
problem of a defendant receiving legal aid to retain counsel, but then discharging that
counsel shortly before trial.66 The issue before the court was “whether Rockwood was
entitled to have enough public funding to retain whatever counsel he chose, rather than to
be limited to those lawyers willing to work for the legal aid tariff.”67 The court held that
“a person who qualified for legal aid had no right of choice beyond counsel willing to act
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for legal aid rates. At no point did either the trial court or the appeal court inquire into
the reasons for discharge of the earlier counsel.”68 Even the highest Canadian courts
have held that there is no constitutional right to be assigned counsel of a defendant’s own
choosing if the accused is indigent and subject to a provincial legal aid program.69

3. ENGLAND/UNITED KINGDOM
The Legal Aid Act of 1988 is designed to provide “advice, assistance, [mediation]
and representation which is publicly funded with a view to helping persons who might
otherwise be unable to obtain …[such] on account of their means.”70 When looking at
the criminal legal aid section of the Statute, the relevant sections are §21(2) and (9)
Availability of Representation under this Part; §22(2) Criteria for grant of representation
for trial proceedings; and the most relevant section is §32(1) Selection and assignment of
legal representatives. To answer the question of whether an indigent defendant under the
British scheme is able to choose or is appointed counsel, this memo only focuses on
section 32 of the Legal Aid Statute.
Section 32(1) of the Legal Aid Act states that “a person is entitled to receive
advice or assistance or representation may [select the legal representative to advise, assist
or act for him from among the legal representatives willing] to provide advice, assistance
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or representation under this Act.”71 Thus, in England, an indigent defendant in a criminal
case has a choice as to which solicitor and counsel he employs.72 Currently, there is not
even a public defender’s service, similar to the United States, which would employ
barristers and solicitors to defend indigent defendants.73 In an amendment brought before
Parliament, the Lords studied and argued about how best to provide defendants
representation under the legal aid scheme.74 The outcome was that defendants granted
representation under the Legal Aid Act can choose who they wish to represent them so
long as it does not offend the court’s own rules and the legal aid procedures set out under
the Statute.
4. SOUTH AFRICA
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (‘the
Constitution’) came into operation on April 27, 1994. Before the new Constitution came
into effect, “a legal applicant could choose his or her lawyer from a list, but this system
proved ineffective as certain attorneys received a disproportionate share of cases.”75 A
letter from the Legal Aid Board of South Africa to the ICTR on January 19, 1999, stated
“in criminal cases, legal aid clients do not have a choice of legal representative.”76
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Therefore, as a result of the failing system, under the new Constitution, there exists no
right to choose appointed defense counsel in South Africa.77
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